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I. The Conflict in U.S. Policy
A. Introduction
The United States is a net technology exporter.' Promoting tech-
nology exportation is profitable not only for U.S. companies, but for
the U.S. economy as well.2 However, American companies and U.S.
policy makers place importance on protecting transferred technology. 3
Congress acts mainly through domestic law in its efforts to protect the
transferred technology. 4
I Technology is property created by the mind. For purposes of this Article, the terms
intellectual property, technology, and intangible property are used interchangeably encom-
passing the broad Internal Revenue Code definition:
any... patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern .... knowhow[,]
... copyright, literary, musical ... or artistic composition[,] ... trademark,
tradename, ... brandname[,]... franchise, license.... contract[,] ... method,
program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, estimate, cus-
tomer list.... technical data[,] ... or... any similar item, which has substantial
value independent of the services of any individual.
I.R.C. § 936(h) (3) (B) (1986).
2 In 1990, U.S. receipts on international patent and license transactions were $15.3
billion; expenditures were $2.7 billion. These figures reflect a net export surplus of $12.6
billion. See Daniel F. Perez, Exploitation and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 10 COM-
PUTER LAw., No. 8, at 10, 17 (1993).
3 United States International Trade Commission, Foreign Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights and the Effect on US Industry and Trade: Report to the United States Trade
Representative, USITC Pub. 2065, Inv. No. 332-245, at vii-viii (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter USITC
Report].
4 The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of science
and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t] ime to [a] uthors and [i] nventors the exclusive right
to their respective [wiritings and [d]iscoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Federal statutory law protects: patents, United States Patents Act, Pub. L. No. 593-950,
66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988)); trademarks, Trade-
mark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 489-540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1988)); and copyrights, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Intellectual
property broadly included in trade secrets and know-how is protected by state law. See, e.g.,
CAL. CrV. CODE § 3426 (West 1994). The international legal system does not protect intellec-
tual property rights as effectively as domestic systems. For a discussion of international trea-
ties that protect intellectual property rights, and their relative ineffectiveness due to their
lack of enforcement power and dispute settlement mechanisms, see Marshall A. Leaffer,
Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv.
273, 275-76, 292-94 (1991). Some commentators argue that the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade (GATr), which provides a forum for negotiations and has enforcement
mechanisms not available in other multilateral treaties, would be more effective in the inter-
national protection of intellectual property rights. Id. at 300. At the time of this writing, the
effect of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods-negotiated in the Uruguay round of the GATT talks and signed on April
15, 1994-on the international protection of intellectual property rights is not known.
GATT, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual PropeFy Rights, Including Trade in Coun-
terfeit Goods, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), The agreement should provide some protection;
it provides that "members shall ensure that enforcement procedures ... are available under
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The main goal of American companies is to preserve the financial
value of the technology through license and franchise agreements.
The U.S. government, wishing to protect the technology, takes aggres-
sive action against counterfeiting, piracy, and other real or perceived 5
unfair business practices of foreign companies or their governments. 6
The U.S. government, however, has competing interests in regu-
lating technology transfer. It desires to: (1) promote the transfer of
technology and protect its financial value; (2) inhibit, for national se-
curity purposes, the transfer of certain technology;7 and (3) prevent
the erosion of the U.S. tax revenue base.8
Congress reacts to these competing interests by enacting legisla-
tion. National security legislation is designed to inhibit the transfer of
technology in certain cases; tax legislation is not designed to do so, but
in fact, may inhibit the transfer of technology.
This Article reviews-in the context of a hypothetical company
(High-Tech, Inc.)-the international agreements, federal legislation,
and regulations that address the competing interests of U.S. policy
makers. It focuses on federal tax statutes and regulations used to curb
improper tax strategies.9 It argues that the law creates uncertain tax
burdens for U.S. companies, such as High-Tech, and concludes that
technology transfer across national borders is inhibited by the enemy
within-the uncertainty of the tax cost.10 The Article calls for an end
to the uncertainty by offering several possible solutions.1
their [national] law[s] so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intel-
lectual property rights covered by this Agreement.. . " Id. at 99.
5 Legislation aimed at stopping perceived unfair business practices by foreign states or
foreign companies has increased recently. This legislation raises the question of whether
unfair business practices by foreign states have increased, or whether the United States
merely perceives an increase in such practices given our economic reversal of fortune and
massive federal deficit. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Antonio Mendoza, The
Creeing Breach of International Law, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & ComP. L.J. 107, 108 (1993).
6 Unfair methods of competition specifically include the infringement of copyrights,
patents, and trademarks. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(C) (1988). The principal U.S. trade
negotiating objective is "to seek the enactment and effective enforcement by foreign coun-
tries of laws which ... recognize and adequately protect intellectual property ... [and] pro-
vide protection against unfair competition." Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101(b) (10) (A), 102 Stat. 1107, 1134-35 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2901).
7 Congress aptly .described these competing interests: "It is the policy of the United
States to use its economic resources and trade potential to further the sound growth and
stability of its economy as well as to further its national security and foreign policy objectives."
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(4) (1988).
8 Technology has enormous value in the U.S. economy. In 1986, out of 736 firms
surveyed nationally, 245 firms, representing sales of $ 1.114 trillion, reported that 80% of
their sales were directly affected by intellectual property rights. USITC Report, supra note 3,
at viii. In 1986, it was estimated that the loss of revenue as a result of inadequate intellectual
property protection amounted to $23.8 billion in the United States. Id.
9 See infra part IV.
10 See infra part V.A.2.
11 See infra part V.B. discussing possible solutions.
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B. The Hypothetical Case of High-Tech, Inc.
In our hypothetical, High-Tech is a new innovative high technol-
ogy company, highly successful in developing patents and manufactur-
ing products in the United States. It has been granted a patent on a
widget that is designed for nonmilitary applications but which can be
converted to military use. Research and development costs for the in-
vention amounted to $100,000. High-Tech believes that widget sales
will be very. good in Latina, a developing country.
High-Tech would rather manufacture the widget in the United
States and simply sell it in Latina through a Foreign Sales Corpora-
tion.12 However, the tax law does not permit its use in this case as
intangible property is involved, and such property is considered
nonexportable.13 In addition, as a condition to entering the Latina
market, that government is requiring the use of a Latina corporation
and the establishment of a manufacturing plant there.14
High-Tech formed Latina, S.A., a Latina corporation, as a wholly
owned subsidiary, capitalizing it by purchasing $300,000 of its capital
stock. High-Tech then entered into a royalty agreement with Latina,
S.A., basing royalties on a patent value of $200,000.15
The foregoing business plan, while relatively simple, illustrates sev-
eral areas of risk confronting exporters of technology. High-Tech
faces the following uncertainties: (1) Will it lose its technology, or the
profits from the sale of the manufactured widget?1 6 (2) Will its intellec-
tual property rights be protected?17 (3) Will the U.S. government allow
12 A Foreign Sales Corporation is any foreign corporation meeting: (a) the organiza-
tional requirements of I.R.C. § 922 (a) (1) (1986), including being organized in an eligible
jurisdiction, with no more than 25 shareholders, having no preferred stock outstanding and
having at least one nonresident on the board of directors; and (b) the foreign presence
requirements of I.R.C. § 924(b) (1) (1986). See generally I.R.C. §§ 921-928 (1986).
13 The Foreign Sales Corporation regime, I.R.C. §§ 921-928, provides a partial exclu-
sion from U.S. taxation on income, I.R.C. § 921(a), from sales of certain export property,
I.R.C. §§ 924(a) (1), 927(a), if certain foreign management and economic process require-
ments are met. I.R.C. § 924(b)-(e). It would appear that the Foreign Sales Corporation tax
regime could have reduced High-Tech's tax bill; however, this regime cannot be used in the
context of this hypothetical since intangible property cannot be'export property. I.R.C.
§ 927(a) (2) (B).
14 Trade regulation by developing countries is generally stricter and more pervasive
than that of developed countries. Developing countries use trade regulation to increase fi-
nancial and economic stability, improve their foreign currency position, expand their tech-
nological base, increase employment, protect their infant industries, or in any other manner
which will increase the standard of living of their citizens. See generally Robert J. Radway,
Antitrust, Technology Transfers and Joint Ventures in Latin American Development, 15 LAw. AM. 47
(1983); Michael W. Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth with Foreign Invest-
ment: Controlled but Participatory Independence, 10 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1973).
15 Assume that the exact fair market value of the patent cannot be determined at the
present time. Not having an exact comparable, the $200,000 value represents industry aver-
ages for similar products.
16 See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
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the transfer of technology to Latina?18 (4) What is the tax cost of the
sale transaction with Latina, S.A.? 19
II. U.S. Efforts to Protect and Enhance the Transfer of Technology
by U.S. Persons
A. The Dual Risk of Technology Transfer
Once High-Tech has transferred its patented wi dget technology to
Latina, S.A., its business plan may be thwarted in various ways. First, it
may lose the technology outright.20 Less dramatically, it may have its
profits diluted through counterfeiting, piracy, or the gray market.21
U.S. law creates a distinction between counterfeiting/piracy and
gray market sales. 22 It aggressively attempts to curtail counterfeiting
and piracy, while permitting U.S. gray market sales.23 If a gray market
emerges,24 High-Tech will probably not have any legal recourse. 25
However, if the widget is counterfeited or pirated, formidable statutory
and treaty relief is available to High-Tech. 26
B. The Attack on Counterfeiting and Piracy
The United States attacks counterfeiting and piracy both at the
international27 and domestic levels. 28 Domestically, federal legisla-
18 See infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 52-106 and accompanying text.
20 Developing countries, for reasons ranging from cultural attitudes toward private
property, availability of essential commodities, and political environment, do not have a
problem with appropriating new products and technologies from foreigners-especially
from foreigners in developed countries. Therefore, the risk of losing the technology is very
real. See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights, 28 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 89, 107-10 (1993).
21 "Parallel imports, or grey market goods, are goods manufactured outside the target
country bearing trademarks duly registered in their country of manufacture that are sold in
the target country in competition with the same goods produced by the target country's
authorized manufacturers or distributors... ." See generally Harry Rubin, Destined to Remain
Grey: The Eternal Recurrence of Parallel Imports, 26 IrNr'L LAW. 597, 597 (1992).
22 See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
23 The U.S. Customs Service interprets § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 741
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988)), as allowing the entry of gray market goods
when the trademark is owned by the same person or when the owners are subject to common
ownership or control. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (c)(1) (1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that
the Customs' view is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. K Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 294 (1988).
24 A gray market emerges when a currency value fluctuates. The fluctuation causes a
price differential for the same goods. A disparity in the U.S. price versus the foreign price
creates an incentive to purchase the product abroad and resell in the United States. See
David Bender & David A. Gerber, In Wake of High Court Decision, The Gray Market Gets Grayer,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 15.
25 But see Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (deny-
ing importation of gray market goods when party opposing importation showed that it had
"developed in the United States marketplace'a substantial goodwill separate and distinct
from the goodwill emanating from the branded goods themselves").
26 See supra note 4 and infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
27 See supra note 4 for a discussion of multilateral international efforts to protect intel-
lectual property rights.
28 See supra note 4.
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tion 29 provides relief against piracy and counterfeiting of trade-
marks,30 copyrights,31 and patent infringement. 32
While it is clearly U.S. policy to curb counterfeiting, direct action
against counterfeiters is rather ineffectual. 33 Even the potent statutory
relief preventing the product's importation is hampered by a narrow
Customs' interpretation 34 and by the enormous logistical problem of
locating the port of entry of counterfeit goods. Recognizing the practi-
cal difficulties in finding and prosecuting counterfeiters, and recogniz-
ing that certain countries are notorious for allowing counterfeiters to
operate within their borders, 35 Congress has authorized unilateral ac-
tion by the United States Executive Branch to encourage change in the
offending country's policy towards counterfeiters. 36 The United States
also uses a carrot37 and stick 38 approach in urging certain of its treaty
29 The Tariff Act of 1930 makes it unlawful to import articles into the United States that
infringe on valid and enforceable U.S. patents, copyrights, or trademarks. 46 Stat. 741 (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1988)). Relief under the Act includes: denial of
entry of the goods into the country, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d), 1526(a) (1988); seizure and forfei-
ture, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(i), 1526(b) and (e) (1988); and injunctive relief and damages against
any person dealing in such merchandise, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(f) (1)-(2), 1526(c) (1988).
30 The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 imposes criminal penalties for the inten-
tional trafficking or attempted trafficking in goods with counterfeit marks. Pub. L. No. 98-
473, §§ 1501-1503, 98 Stat. 2178, 2179 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1988)).
31 It is unlawful to import copyrighted material without the authorization of the owner.
17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1988). If such goods are found in the United States, they are subject to
seizure. 17 U.S.C. § 603(c) (1988).
32 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1) (1988).
33 Statutory penalties are illusory since obtaining jurisdiction over foreign defendants is
very difficult. See, e.g., In the Matter of Certain Personal Computers and Components
Thereof, USITC Pub. 1504, Inv. No. 337-TA-140 (1984) (20 defendants were named, only 2
bothered to participate).
34 The U.S. Customs Service has historically interpreted the statute narrowly. For exam-
ple, computers alleged to be in violation of Apple Computers copyrights were allowed into
the country because the "Read Only Memory" operating unit had been removed by the im-
porter. See Importation of 'Rom-less' Computers Not Barred Under § 602(b) of Copyright Act, U.S.
Import Wkly. (BNA) No. 9, at 1062 (May 30, 1984).
35 Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, and China are frequently cited for failing to protect
intellectual property rights. See Gutterman, supra note 20, at 97.
36 Under federal law, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is required to
identify "those foreign countries that... deny adequate and effective protection of intellec-
tual property rights, or ... deny fair and equitable market access to United States persons
that rely upon intellectual property protection ...." 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988). Once a coun-
try is identified, the USTR may open an investigation with respect to any suspect act, policy,
or practice of that country. 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). Upon a negative finding by the USTR,
broad authority is given to him "to ... suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of,
benefits of trade concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country re-
ferred to in such subsection; ... impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of
... such foreign country for such time as the Trade Representative determines appropriate."
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988).
37 The carrot is the Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2464 (1988),
which provides for "duty-free treatment for any eligible article from any beneficiary develop-
ing country in accordance with the provisions of this title ... ." 19 U.S.C. § 2461. Accord
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988).
38 The stick is the removal of benefits. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c) (3) (B) (stating that
"the President shall give great weight to ... the extent to which such country provides ade-
quate and effective means under its law for foreign nationals to secure, to exercise, and to
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partners to heighten protection for the intellectual property rights of
U.S. persons.
Although the ultimate resolution of the counterfeiting/piracy
problem remains unsettled,39 it is clear that the U.S. government pro-
motes technology transfer by aggressively protecting the intellectual
property rights of its citizens. 40 Thus, there is an alliance between the
U.S. government and High-Tech against counterfeiters-an alliance
that abruptly ends when High-Tech decides to export the widget pat-
ent technology.
III. Will High-Tech Be Allowed to Transfer the Widget Patent to
Latina, S.A.?: National Security Implications of the
Transfer of Technology
A basic tenet of international law is that states may regulate the
conduct of persons when national security interests are at stake.4 1 U.S.
statutory law regulating product and technology exports42 and in-
bound capital43 reflects the exercise of this right.
Because the High-Tech transaction contemplates an outbound
transfer of technology, it must procure either a general or validated
enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including patent, trademark, and copyright
rights"). See also 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B) (stating that "the President shall not designate
any country a beneficiary country under this chapter... if such country... has taken steps to
repudiate or nullify ... any patent, trademark, or other intellectual property of, a United
States citizen .. . ).
39 See supra note 4 for a discussion of recent GATT efforts to address the problem.
40 In fact, the United States was criticized by a GATT panel for being too aggressive in
the use of the statutory trade remedy for patent infringement. SeeJudith H. Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 16: Settling Disputes in the GATT: The Past, Present
and Future, 24 INT'L LAw. 519, 528-31 (1990). The GATT panel found that the International
Trade Commission procedures, the statutory deadlines, the prohibiting of counterclaims, the
limitations on the availability of forums and duplicative proceedings, all allowed under U.S.
law, creates conditions that unfairly discriminate against foreign companies. Id.
41 Very broad discretion is given to states in prescribing rules it deems appropriate to
regulate conduct. "[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to... conduct that
... wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory.., or... conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory .. " RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw § 402(1) (1986).
42 The Export Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988)), regulates the exportation of products or
technology. The Act gives great authority to the President to restrict exports. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2404. The President delegated these powers to the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary
responded by developing a licensing system. See generally Export Administration Regulations,
15 C.F.R. §§ 768-799 (1992). Generally, the exportation from the United States of all com-
modities and technical data is prohibited "unless and until a general license authorizing such
export shall have been established or a validated license or other authorization for such
export shall have been granted." 15 C.F.R. § 770.3(a) (1992).
43 In August of 1988, fearing impairment of national security if foreign interests were to
gain control of high technology U.S. companies, Congress passed the Exon-Florio amend-
ment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021,
102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170). The statute empowers the President
or his designee, after an investigation, to determine the effect any merger, acquisition, or
proposed takeover by a foreign person may have on national security. Id. If national security
is threatened, the President may suspend or prohibit the acquisition merger or takeover. Id.
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license. 4 4 Among the risks High-Tech faces is that neither type of li-
cense may be available. Another risk is that the process may be pro-
tracted. 45 Moreover, stiff penalties46 and strict liability4 7 require High-
Tech to proceed with great care in seeking to comply with the licens-
ing regime.
National security legislation reflects a deep concern, if not para-
noia, that U.S. companies in seeking to tap global markets might im-
pair national security. The existing regulatory mechanism has come
under increased criticism-some argue that restrictions on inbound
investment are not based on national security concerns but rather are
disguised protectionism, 48 arguably violating international law.4 9
Others contend that export restrictions are anachronistic and need-
lessly inhibit export profits. 50
The export control rules facing High-Tech, as burdensome as they
may be, still afford a basis for planning the venture. If an export li-
cense cannot be obtained, High-Tech cannot do the deal; it may forgo
potential profits, but it will not incur the expense of opening the La-
tina subsidiary. Regardless, it can make its various contractual under-
takings contingent, upon receiving a license. Sooner or later High-
Tech will know its fate. The tax law, however, does not offer such
predictability. 5 '
44 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403.
45 Even if a license is ultimately granted, the time delays can be enormous. See, e.g.,
Daedalus Enters., Inc. v. Baldridge, 563 F. Supp. 1345 (D.D.C. 1983) (where the license appli-
cation process took over 29 months even though the statutory timetable provides an applica-
tion process time of 240 days). See'also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409.
46 Penalties include fines reaching five times the value of the exported goods, or
$1,000,000, whichever is greater; imprisonment for up to ten years; and the loss of export
privileges. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410.
47 15 C.F.R. § 772.1(c) (1993).
48 By obtaining governmental intervention on national security grounds, an unwilling
target could abuse the process and thwart a valid takeover attempt. See generally Jonathan A.
Knee, Limiting Abuse of Exon-Florio by Takeover Targets, 23 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 475
(1989).
49 Exon-Florio can be construed as denying national treatment to foreign nationals, a
guarantee promised under many U.S. treaties. See generallyJose E. Alvarez, Political Protection-
ism and United States Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Forio, 30 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 120-29 (1989); Note, The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate
U.S. Treaty Commitments?, 72 MicH. L. REv. 551, 567-92 (1974) (analyzing 11 treaties using the
national treatment standard).
50 The Clinton administration supports legislation that overhauls the current export
licensing system. -Clinton Unveils Export Plan Addressing Controls, Financing, Int'l Trade Daily,
(BNA) (Sept. 30, 1993), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAITD File. Recognizing that the
existing export licensing system is a relic from the cold war past, the new system seeks to
minimize uncertainty in export controls while not placing U.S. companies at a competitive
disadvantage vis-d-vis foreign competitors, unless there is "a significant risk to the foreign
policy, nonproliferation or national security interests of the United States... ." S. Res. 1902,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3, 5 (1994) (enacted).
51 See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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IV. Federal Tax Legislation: What Is the Tax Cost to High-Tech?
A. The Tax Avoidance Strategy
Certainty of a transaction's tax cost is a critical factor in any busi-
ness decision. High-Tech could incur the expense of the Latina sub-
sidiary and lose the potential profits to the tax man. The problem
faced by High-Tech is that it partially fits the profile, albeit inadver-
tently, of the taxpayer in the classic tax avoidance strategy.
The strategy works as follows. A U.S. company develops a high
profit patent.52 The research and development costs, deductible in
the United States,53 reduce U.S. taxable income. Just before the prod-
uct which is subject to the patent is marketed, which generates sales
income, 54 the U.S. company sells or otherwise transfers the patent to a
related foreign affiliate at or below cost. 55 If organized in a tax haven
country,56 the affiliate pays no tax in either the tax haven or the
United States.
B. Federal Legislation to Discourage the Tax Avoidance Strategy
Through the years, Congress has enacted a formidable array of
statutes amending the federal income tax system to discourage the tax
avoidance strategy.57 The question is whether current tax law is a
1
52 Congress targets sales or transfers of high profit intangibles to related parties, believ-
ing that improper tax strategies pose "[a] fundamental problem ... particularly acute in the
case of... high profit intangibles...." H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 424 (1985).
53 Fifty percent of the research and development expenditures must be allocated to the
country where the expenditures are made, and 50% are allocated according to the source of
taxpayers gross sales. I.R.C. § 864(f) (1986).
54 U.S. citizens pay tax on worldwide income; the only required nexus is citizenship. See
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). If the U.S. company markets the widget in Latina, it will be
taxed on Latina sales income in the United States. To avoid income recognition, the com-
pany disposes of the patent before generating income. Avoiding income recognition by the
U.S. company while deducting the research and development costs is the first leg of the tax
avoidance strategy.
55 Foreign corporations pay tax only on U.S. source income, unless they are engaged in
a trade or business in the United States. If so, any income from whatever source will also be
subject to U.S. tax, so long as that income is effectively connected to the U.S. trade or busi-
ness. Treas. Reg. § 1.881-1(b) (as amended in 1973). Structuring the transaction so the
company earning the income will not be subject to U.S. tax is the second leg of the tax
avoidance strategy.
56 Generally tax haven countries do not impose income taxes on business operations
conducted outside their borders. Tax haven countries include such diverse places as the
Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and Gibraltar. For a complete listing of popular
tax haven countries, see ANTHoNY S. GINSBERG, TAX HAVENS 14 (1991).
57 Two federal income tax systems operate in the United States. One system consists of
those rules scattered throughout the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL IN-
COME TAXATION: CODE AND TAX REGULATIONS, SELECTED SECTIONS (Richard C. Pugh and
Charles H. Gustafson eds., 1993) (a 2,608 page compilation of international code sections
and regulations). The other system is the tax treaty network involving over 40 countries. See
generally Tax Treaties Status Table, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1009, at 1303-05 (1993) (listing
all countries that are U.S. treaty partners). We will assume that Latina does not have a tax
treaty with the United States. Therefore, the tax implications are determined under the
Internal Revenue Code.
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proper response to improper taxpayer strategies, or merely a myopic
approach resulting from a preoccupation with revenue. A summary of
the rules targeting transfers, or sales, of appreciated technology prop-
erty follows.58
1. The Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) Rules [I.R. C.
§§ 951-964]
The Controlled Foreign Corporation tax regime's goal is to pre-
vent improper arrangements between U.S. shareholders and their
Controlled Foreign Corporations. 59 It targets transactions lacking eco-
nomic or business substance. The tax rules, when they apply, deny
entity status to the CFC, treating it essentially as a conduit of the U.S.
shareholder.60 Thus, any income lacking business or economic sub-
stance, i.e., Subpart F income, 61 earned by the CFC is deemed distrib-
uted to the U.S. shareholder as it is earned. Only Subpart F income is
considered earned by U.S. shareholders. Non-Subpart F income, on
the other hand, is generally deferable by the shareholders, and hence,
allows for a delay in the reporting of any CFC income until an actual
distribution is made by the CFC. 62
2. The Forced Sale Provision of L.kC. § 367(d)
While the CFC tax regime focuses on corporate operations, I.R.C.
section 367 addresses the tax issues in the initial funding of a corpora-
tion. In a domestic context, if the initial funding is achieved by trans-
ferring appreciated intangible property solely in exchange for stock,
where the transferor is in control of the corporation after the ex-
change, the transaction is treated as a change in form only and not a
58 See infra notes 59106 and accompanying text.
59 A controlled foreign corporation is a foreign corporation where "more than 50 per-
cent of... the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation entitled
to vote, or... the total value of the stock of such corporation, is owned ... by United States
shareholders." I.R.C. § 957(a) (1986). United States shareholders means "a United States
person... who owns... 10% or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote of such foreign corporation." I.R.C. § 951 (b) (1986).
60 "If a foreign corporation is a controlled foreign corporation for an uninterrupted
period of 30 days or more during any taxable year, every person who is a United States
shareholder... of such corporation . . . shall include in his gross income ... his pro-rata
share . . . of the corporation's Subpart F income for such year .... " I.R.C. § 951 (a) (1)
(1986).
61 Only 'Subpart F' income is deemed distributed. Subpart F income includes income
and certain expenditures. I.R.C. § 952(a)' (1986). Among the types of income included is
the income relevant in our case-foreign based company sales income. I.R.C. §§ 952(a),
954(a) and (d)(1) (1986).
62 I.R.C. § 951 (a)(1) (A). However, even non-Subpart F CFC income can be classified as
distributed to the extent that it is invested in U.S. property. I.R.C. § 951(a) (1) (B). Thus, if
the CFC acquires tangible personal property located in the United States; stock of a U.S.
corporation; or intangible property for use in the United States, the amounts invested are
considered distributed to the U.S. shareholder. I.R.C. § 956(b) (1) (1986). In addition,
loans to a U.S. person, including the U.S. shareholder, are also regarded to be distributed.
I.R.C. § 956(b)(1)(C).
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sale, and thus, the transfer is tax free. 63 By contrast, tax-free treatment
is not available for analogous transfers involving foreign corpora-
tions,64 thereby forcing a sale and gain recognition. 6 5 Moreover, the
income is considered U.S. source,6 thus reducing the availability of
the foreign tax credit.67 If the transaction is structured as a sale, I.R.C.
section 482, instead of I.R.C. section 367(d), applies. 68
3. The Pre-1986 Reallocation Provision of IR.C. § 482
I.R.C. section 482 is a very brief,69 but extremely broad, provision.
It gives the Secretary of the Treasury7" virtually unbridled authority to
re-allocate income between related parties, resulting in fact-intensive,
costly disputes.7 ' As a result, tax exposure on intercompany transac-
tions is difficult to predict.72
High-Tech may avoid the loss of income deferral because even
though Latina, S.A., is a CFC, it will probably not have Subpart F in-
come. 73 Since High-Tech is transferring the widget patent to Latina,
63 I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c) (1986).
64 I.R.C. § 367(a)(1) (1986).
65 I.R.C. § 367(a) (3) (A) provides a limited exception to the forced sale rule of I.R.C.
§ 367(a) (1) in cases where the transfer involves property that is to be used in the active
conduct of a trade or business. The trade or business exception, however, is not available on
the transference of intangible property. I.R.C. § 367(a) (3) (B) (iv) (1986).
66 I.R.C. § 367(d)(2)(C) (1986).
67 The foreign. tax credit is intended to reduce the negative effects of the worldwide
income implications on U.S. persons. See generally I.R.C. §§ 901-908 (1986). The payment of
the foreign tax can be credited against U.S. tax liability. Critical to the availability of the tax,
however, is the existence of foreign income. I.R.C. § 901 (b)(1). The effect of the special
I.R.C. § 367(d) (2) (C) rule eliminates the availability of the foreign tax credit.
68 I.R.C. § 367 is limited to those transactions involving some form of corporate reor-
ganization. I.R.C. § 367(a) (1986). In all other cases I.R.C. § 482, because of its broader
scope, will apply. I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
69 Enacted in the 1930s, the pre-1986 Code section read in pertinent part:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or
not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482.
70 Only the government can reallocate income under I.R.C. § 482; the taxpayer cannot
use § 482 to reallocate income. See id.
71 See Eli Lilly v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985) (a 195 page case that demonstrates
the fact-intensive nature of an I.R.C. § 482 reallocation issue)..The factual nature of the dis-
putes, in turn, creates costs for economists, engineers, lawyers, and others.
72 The uncertainty was minimized, however, by allowing the taxpayer relief when she
could establish that the stated price was at an arms-length value. Such a finding prevents the
Commissioner from applying the reallocation provisions of Section 482. See Marc M. Levey &
Stanley C. Ruchelman, Section 482-The Super Royalty Prmvisions Adopt the Commensurate Standard,
41 TAx LAw. 611, 621-24 (1988) (discussing the pre-1986 intangible property intercompany
pricing rules and the arm's-length standard).
73 Latina, S.A., intends to manufacture and sell the widget in Latina. Thus, the income
generated will not be Subpart F income. See I.R.C. § 954(a)(1) (1986).
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S.A., through a royalty agreement, the forced sale provision of I.R.C.
section 367(d) does not apply.74 However, the reallocation of income
rules in I.R.C. section 482 do apply. Indeed, the 1986 amendment to
I.R.C section 482 increased High-Tech's exposure. 75
4. The Post-1 986 Reallocation Provision of I.RC. § 482: The
"Super Royalty"
a. The Enactment of the Legislation
The technique of transferring intangibles to a related foreign cor-
poration in a low or no tax jurisdiction has prompted concern in Con-
gress with taxpayer behavior. 76 Accordingly, technology transfers, 77 or
licenses,78 to foreign corporations, or possessions corporations, 79 are
now subject to a new standard of income allocation.8 0
Dubbed the "Super Royalty," 8 its purpose is to allocate income
from intangibles among the members of the multinational group in a
74 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
75 See infra part IV.B.4.
76 The House Report reflects this concern:
There is strong incentive for taxpayer to transfer intangibles to related foreign
corporations or possessions corporations in a low tax jurisdiction, particularly
when the intangible has a high value relative to manufacturing or assembly
costs. Such transfers can result in indefinite tax deferral or effective tax exemp-
tion on the earnings, while retaining the value of the earnings in the related
group.
H.R REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 423 (1985).
However, some commentators argue that the super royalty provisions are "really just one
more manifestation of the 1986 Tax Reform Act's almost palpable paranoia regarding tax-
payer behavior, a paranoia that explains a wide variety of truly bizarre provisions .... " Rich-
ard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement and the Special Challenge of Transfer Pricing, 1990 U.
ILL. L. Rav. 299, 315.
77 I.R.C. § 367(d) was amended to require the amount of the forced sale in the case of
an intangible to be "commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible." I.R.C.
§ 367(d)(2)(A) (1986).
78 The new standard requires that "[i]n the case of any transfer (or license) ofintangible
property... the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with
the income attributable to the intangible." I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
79 Possessions Corporations are corporations formed pursuant to the laws of U.S. pos-
sessions as defined in I.R.C. § 936(d)(1) (1986).
In 1982, tax law changes to I.R.C. § 936 gave possessions corporations favored tax treat-
ment on the transfer of appreciated intangible property by removing the applicability of the
forced sale provision of I.R.C. § 367. In addition, substantial tax benefits inured to posses-
sions corporations using the cost-sharing option method in accounting for income from in-
tangibles transferred from U.S. companies. Congress was concerned that tax advantages
under I.R.C. § 936, claimed by certain taxpayers using possessions corporations, were exces-
sive. H.R. RaP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 423 (1985). Acting on that concern, I.R.C.
§ 936(h) (5) (C) (i) (1) was amended in 1986 to require that the cost sharing payment amount
shall be commensurate with the ' income attributable to the intangible. I.R.C.
§ 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(1) (1986).
80 The changes to the Code have been criticized for the uncertainty created for Puerto
Rican possessions corporations. International Taxes: Cost-Sharing Changes in Sec. 482 Proposal
Seen Adding to Sec. 936 Firms' Uncertainty, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 231, at D-32 (Dec. 1,
1992) (arguing that the changes will retard investment in Puerto Rico).
81 Congress felt that industry averages were not adequate measures to establish the
value of the transferred intangible; it found that "compensation for the intangible should be
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manner that reflects the relative economic activities of each. 82
Although admirable in intent, the new standard is very imprecise. It
also reflects questionable policy as it erodes83 the arm's-length stan-
dard that the United States has long espoused on an international
level.8 4 At least two commentators find the new provision "contradic-
tory" and "unwarranted." 85
b. The Attempts to Explain the Statute: Searching for
Suitable Explanations
Essentially, the 1986 amendment exacerbates the valuation prob-
lem that has long plagued intercompany transactions. 8 6 Recall that
High-Tech formed Latina, S.A., as its wholly owned subsidiary. It then
licensed the widget patent for $200,000 using industry averages to es-
tablish the price, 87 reporting a gain on the sale.88 Will the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) agree with High-Tech on the amount of the
gain? The answer is maybe, and thus, turns High-Tech's tax planning
into a crap shoot.
Congress recognized that important issues were left unanswered
by the language in the amendment.89 It called upon the IRS to con-
duct a comprehensive study of the intercompany pricing issue and to
modify the rules accordingly.90 Two years after the Congressional
mandate, the IRS issued its much criticized "white paper" explaining
the amendment.9' In January 1992, four years after the issuance of the
greater than industry averages or norms." See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 425
(1985) (hence the term "super royalty").
82 H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-637 (1986).
83 While not explicitly abandoning the arm's-length standard in the case of intangibles,
Congress felt that "[t]here are extreme difficulties in determining whether the arm's length
transfer between unrelated parties are comparable. The Committee thus concludes that it is
appropriate to require that the payment made on a transfer of intangibles to a foreign re-
lated corporation ... be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible .... "
H.R. REp. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 425 (1985).
84 See also the discussion on the effect under international obligations in part V.A.3
infrta For an analysis of the Congressional reasoning and a discussion of the demise .of the
arms-length standard, see Levey & Ruchelman, supra note 72, at 628-35.
85 Ernest F. Aud, Jr. & Deloris R. Wright, An Analysis of the Super-Royalty Provisions of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 16 TAX MGMT. INT'LJ. 17, 19 (1987).
86 Valuation problems are nothing new. See generally Eli Lilly v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.
996 (1985) (where the dispute involved the valuation of pharmaceutical patents). However,
Eli Lilly was a 195 page fact-intensive opinion that had little precedential value.
87 Under prior regulations, value could be established by the "prevailing rates in the
same industry. . . . " Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii)(a) (as amended in 1968).
88 Establishing a value of $200,000 and using the adjusted basis of the patent widget as
$100,000, High-Tech would realize a gain of $100,000. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1986).
89 The statute simply states that the value attributed to the intangible must be "com-
mensurate with the income attributable to the intangible...." I.R.C. §§ 367(d), 482 (1986).
90 H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-638 (1986).
91 See International Taxes: 482 White Paper Raises Double Taxation Concerns for Foreign Tax
Officials, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 210, at DER G-3 (Oct. 31 1988) (noting that American
tax practioners are critical of Treasury White Paper); International Taxes: Section 482 Criticized
as Remnoving Certainty on Cost Sharing Agreements, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 210, at DER G-2
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"white paper," proposed regulations were issued that largely aban-
doned many of the "white paper" positions. 92 The proposed regula-
tions were themselves repealed after much criticism. 93 In January
1993, temporary regulations were issued.94 Truly, IRS efforts attempt-
ing to explain I.R.C. section 482 have been imprecise and un-
illuminating. Final regulations (which were effective as of July 8,
1994),95 while lengthy and detailed, do not provide much certainty to
business planners.96
c. The Quest for Certainty Under the Regulations:
Searching in Vain
The regulations provide several methods to value intangibles: 97
(1) the comparable uncontrolled transaction method;98 (2) the com-
parable profits method;9 9 and (3) any other method to reach true
arm's-length value. 100 The regulations' intangible property valuation
methods 01 resemble those provided in the regulations for tangible
(Oct. 31, 1988) (Price Waterhouse criticizes White Paper). See generaUy U.S. TREAsuRY DEP.T,
A STUDy OF INTERCOMPANY PRICING 1988-2 C.B. 458, reprinted in 1988-49 I.R.B. 7-83, and in
Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, at 1 (Oct. 20, 1988) (extra ed.).
92 See generally Intercompany Transfer Pricing and Cost Sharing Regulations Under Sec-
tion 482, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992) (notice of proposed rulemaking under I.R.C. § 482).
93 The proposed regulations were criticized for having gone beyond the statutory
amendment and legislative history of the Act. See International Taxes: IRS' Sec 482 Proposal
Seen Over Extending 1986 Commensurate-With-Income Standard, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at
D6 (Aug. 7, 1992).
94 Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-OT to 1.482-7T (1994).
95 Final Regulations with an effective date of July 8, 1994 (except for sections 1.482-OT
through 6T which have an effective date of October 6, 1994) were issued on July 1, 1994.
Internal Revenue Service Final Regulations, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 126, at D-42 (July 5, 1994)
(Special Supplemental Report). No substantive changes from the Temporary Regulations
were made.
96 At least one commentator believes that the new rules will increase controversy and
decrease certainty. See Transfer Pricing: IRS Issues Accuracy Penalty Regulations Than Conform To
New Section 482 Rules, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 127, at D9 (July 6, 1994).
97 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T(a)(1) (1994).
98 Under this method, arm's-length means the consideration charged, or incurred, in a
comparable uncontrolled transaction. Factors used to determine comparability include: the
class of the intangible; the type of process, or know-how; and the profit potential of the
intangible. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T(c) (1994).
99 The comparable profits method relies on the general principle that similarly situated
taxpayers will tend to earn similar returns. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T (1994).
100 The other method, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T(d), is a catch-all provision permit-
ting the taxpayer to use any method that fulfills the purpose of § 482-to ensure that the
taxpayer clearly reflects its income by placing a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an
uncontrolled taxpayer. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(a)(1) (1994).
The prior regulation's arm's-length value test for intangible property was more subjec-
tive; it referred to proper value as that which unrelated parties involving the same, or similar,
intangible property under the same, or similar, circumstances would use. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-2(d) (2)(ii) (as amended in 1968). The new rules are more objective, seemingly cre-
ating the specificity of the tangible property valuation rules.
101 There is no strict hierarchy among the rules. The regulations merely provide that
the best method is the one that provides the most accurate measure of an arm's-length result
under the facts and circumstances of the case. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(b)(2)(iii)
(1994).
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property. 10 2 If experience is any guide, however, the "other method"
of valuation will be the IRS's preferred method.103
The use of the "other method" provision creates additional
problems for High-Tech. The temporary regulations place important
limitations on the use of the "other method,"10 4 by imposing burden-
some documentation requirements on the taxpayer, 105 the adherence
of which will not necessarily prevent penalties.10 6
V. Conclusion
A. The Effect of the Amendment and the Regulations
1. The Uncertainty Impacting High-Tech
With the passage of a one-sentence amendment, i.e., I.R.C. section
482, Congress has seemingly imposed a perfect hindsight rule with no
safe harbors for U.S. companies. 10 7 The result is sure to be increased
litigation under section 482. High-Tech, and taxpayers similarly situ-
102 The valuation methods for tangible property includes: the comparable uncontrolled
price method; the resale price method; the cost plus method; unspecified methods; and the
comparable profits method. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-3T(b)-(e) (1994).
103 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNNG
OFFICE, GGD 81-81, REPORT To THE CHIRsMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF
THE UNITED STATES: IRS COULD BETrER PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS IN DETERMINING THE IN-
COME OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 31 (1981) (finding that even though more specific
methods were available, the IRS uses the "other method" to collect 86% of the tax liabilities
under I.R.C. § 482).
104 In order to use the "other method," a taxpayer must disclose the use of the method
by attaching an appropriate disclosure statement to the timely filed return. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-6T (d)(3)(iii)(C) (1994).
105 The taxpayer must prepare "contemporaneous supporting documentation setting
forth: the specific analysis adopted, an analysis of why the method used provides the most
accurate measure and the data supporting its application." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
6T(d)(2)(iii) (1994).
Some analysts, however, report that the compliance costs have run as high as $1,000,000
to some firms. Transfer Pricing: Firms Should Scrutinize Pricing Methods to Avoid Stiff Penalties
Under Final Rules, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 137, at D8 (July 20, 1994).
106 Penalties for valuation errors under § 482 are severe. For reallocations exceeding
$5,000,000, the penalty is 20% of the tax under payment. I.R.C. § 6662(a) and (e) (1) (B) (ii)
(1994). If the reallocation exceeds $20,000,000, the penalty is 40% of the tax under pay-
ment. I.R.C. § 6662(a) and (h) (1994).
Even if the taxpayer provides all of the documentation requested, such compliance in
itself will not be a sufficient basis to establish the reasonable cause and good faith exception
for the imposition of penalties for valuation errors. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)
(1994).
107 There is limited help for the taxpayer through the Advance Pricing Agreement Pro-
gram (APA). See Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526. The APA program enables a taxpayer to
reach agreement with the Internal Revenue Service on the appropriate transfer pricing
method to be used. When an APA agreement is reached, allocation under I.R.C. § 482 is
permitted only to the extent provided in the APA agreement itself. See generally Intercompany
Transfer Pricing Regulations Under Section 482, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263 (1993) (amending 26
C.F.R. §§ 1, 602). The APA Program has not gained widespread usage. Enacted in 1991, the
IRS reported 70 taxpayers in the program as of the end of the first quarter in 1994. Transfer
Pricing: IRS Says APA Requests Split 50-50 Between US. Parent and Foreign Parent Companies, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 61, at D-4 (Mar. 31, 1994).
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ated, will be at a decided disadvantage, 10 8 and subjected to a whipsaw
effect on the earnings of their controlled foreign corporations.10 9
2. The Impact on the Transfer of Technology
The tax uncertainty can be particularly harmful to new innovative
companies like High-Tech.1 10 The tax uncertainty, coupled with prod-
uct development risks and business problems normally associated with
international operations, could operate in unison to deter companies
from transferring technology transnationally.
U.S. technological advantage could be eroded by the amendment;
tax cost uncertainties discourage product development and refine-
ment because profitable foreign market activity cannot be assured.
The problem may be compounded by the reaction of our trading
partners.1"'
3. The Effect on U.S. International Obligations
The United States as a member of the Organisation of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)1 12 espouses the arm's-length
standard for intercompany pricing, 11 3 often criticizing those-states that
have not supported the standard."14 The new standard subordinates
the arm's-length approach. Recognizing this change in position,
OECD treaty partners have expressed reservations about potential ad-
justments under I.R.C. section 482, and are threatening to pass retalia-
tory legislation.115
108 Civil judicial resolution of tax disputes requires the taxpayer to sustain its position by
a preponderance of the evidence; litigation involving a § 482 adjustment requires the tax-
payer to show that the Service has abused its discretion by being "arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. . ... " Pauline W. Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 125-26 (1964), affld, 358
F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966) (creating a much higher standard).
109 If the Service adjusts income pursuant to § 482, the foreign country would likely not
respect the adjustment, as the foreign governments will most likely not allow a U.S. govern-
ment decision to impact the way they calculate taxes. Thus, the incremental adjustment to
royalties would probably not be a deductible expense in the foreign country.
110 The amendment covers transfers made after November 16, 1985. As such, "the brunt
of the effect of the new law will be felt by emerging... high tech companies; ... [tihese are
the companies ... marketing new products... " See Aud & Wright, supra note 85, at 19.
I1I According to Price Waterhouse International Tax Review, aggressive U.S. transfer
pricing policies are leading some Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries to retaliate against subsidiaries of U.S. multinational companies. Taxleads,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 63, at D-11 (Apr. 14, 1994).
112 The OECD is a multilateral treaty entered into force on December 14, 1960. Includ-
ing the United States, there are 21 signatory countries. One of its principle purposes is to
"contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral non-discriminatory basis ...."
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14,
1960, art. 1, 12 U.S.T. 1730, 1732 T.I.A.S. No. 4891.
113 See Levey & Ruchelman, supra note 72, at 640-41.
114 See Aud & Wright, supra note 85, at 19.
115 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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B. Possible Solutions to the Problem
Creating certainty in the tax implications of technology transfers is
very important.1 16 The government should have the burden of setting
valuation parametets. The government has the ability to accumulate
information from diverse taxpayers. This power should be used to es-
tablish a database for comparables.117 Private taxpayers, in contrast,
cannot effectively assemble such a database. Working in cooperation
with the governments of the OECD, the United States could assemble
information on worldwide royalty payments to establish the com-
parables database.
Certainty could also be provided to the taxpayer by simply includ-
ing the income generated by the foreign subsidiary as Subpart F in-
come.118 This would subject the income from marketing the
intangible to U.S. income tax as it is earned. There would be no rea-
son to manipulate the price in that case, and the result would be more
certainty for the taxpayer.
Finally, the amendment could be repealed and pre-1986 I.R.C.
section 482 regulations used to determine the valuation of the intangi-
ble.119 At the very least, the draconian penalty rules should be re-
pealed or modified. 120 Absent statutory clarity, penalties should not be
imposed where taxpayer willfulness is not found.
At present, the amendment and regulations stifle international
transfer of technology, disrupt international obligations, and invite re-
taliation from our trading partners. Ironically, by engendering unpre-
dictability, existing tax provisions run at cross purposes to U.S. trade
policy which increasingly promotes the transfer of technology.
116 See supra part IV.B.
117 The United States is already using this power against taxpayers. For example, in Nes-
tle Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 803 (1990), the Service determined that the
values used by the taxpayer were not proper. However, in pretrial activity the Service had
engaged in a mass mail-out of letters in search of comparables. Eileen M. Drage, International
Taxes: IRS Seeking 'Nestle' Case Comparables With Mass Mailings, Tax Practitioners Say, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 66, at D-14 (Apr. 7, 1994). Two problems are apparent: (1) If the IRS is
only now searching for comparables, how did they know the taxpayer was wrong? (2) If the
only way to know the correct amountis through these mass mailings how can the taxpayer
ever obtain such information.
118 See Kaplan, supra note 76, at 325. See also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
119 Some commentators believe that effective and appropriate application of pre-1986
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) can prevent the abuses with which Congress was concerned.
See Aud & Wright, supra note 85, at 21.
120 See supra notes 46, 104-06 and accompanying text.
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